

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 069060

72

ORIGIN NEA-05

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /006 R

66619

DRAFTED BY NEA/TUR:RSDILLON

APPROVED BY NEA/TUR:RSDILLON

----- 118370

R 051717Z APR 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 069060

FOLLOWING REPEAT MOSCOW 4704 ACTION SECSTATE, INFO AMMAN
BEIRUT BELGRADE BERLIN BONN BUCHAREST BUDAPEST CAIRO DIA
WASHINGTON DC GENEVA HONG KONG JIDDA LENINGRAD LONDON
USMISSION NATO PARIS PEKING PRAGUE ROME SOFIA TAIPEI TEL
AVIV TOKYO USUN NEW YORK VIENNA WARSAW, CINCPAC HONOLULU
1 APRIL 1974. QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 4704

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE AND MEPC

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR

SUBJ: USSR QUARTERLY TRENDS

1. SUMMARY. THE SOVIET REGIME PERSISTS IN PURSUING
DETENTE WITH UNDIMINISHED GUSTO. THE LEADERSHIP
CONTINUES TO SEE - AND THE PRESS CONTINUES TO ADVER-
TISE - PRESIDENT NIXON'S COMING VISIT AS A MAJOR
EVENT. THE TONE OF MOSCOW'S APPROACH TO DETENTE IS
CHANGING SOMEWHAT, AS EVIDENCED BY A GREATER VOLUME OF HAWKISH
STATEMENTS BY DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO AND MORE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 069060

TENDENTIOUS PRESS TREATMENT OF THE WEST. BUT WE CAN
DISCERN NO SIGNS OF SIGNIFICANT SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT
THE OVERALL WISDOM OF THE POLICY. ON MAJOR EAST-WEST
ISSUES: THE SOVIET DESIRE TO PLAY A CSCE SUMMIT AS

ANOTHER FOREIGN POLICY VICTORY IS BEGINNING TO PRODUCE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN GENEVA; MOSCOW PROBABLY WANTS TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION OVER BERLIN, BUT MAY REQUIRE SOME ALLIED REASSURANCES REGARDING BONN'S INTENTIONS; AND THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE IN NO HURRY IN THE MBFR TALKS. WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO THE UNITED STATES, THE CREDIT ISSUE IS STILL CAUSING CONCERN AND ON SALT THE PROSPECT IS FOR CONTINUED SOVIET TOUGHNESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE MIDDLE EAST SOVIET MOTIVES ARE STILL SOMEWHAT CLOUDED; THEIR HELPFULNESS IN A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS PROBABLY DEPENDS ON THEIR ASSESSMENT OF HOW IT WILL ENHANCE THEIR POSITION WITH THE ARABS. MEANWHILE, SOVIET PREOCCUPATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ARE GROWING. THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN CHINA, PLUS THE TWO RECENT DIPLOMATIC REBUFFS DEALT MOSCOW BY PEKING, HAVE THRUST THE PRC BACK INTO THE FOREFRONT OF SOVIET CONCERNS. MOSCOW WILL ALSO HAVE TO DEVOTE MORE ATTENTION TO A RELATED ISSUE - PREPARATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN AND A WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. INTERNALLY, THE ECONOMY IS PICKING UP AND BREZHNEV IS PUSHING A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE IN AGRICULTURE. AND THE SOVIET LEADER'S OWN PERSONAL STANDING AND POWER SEEM TO BE ON AN UPWARD CURVE. END SUMMARY.

2. LEONID ILYICH, HEAD OF THE POLITBURO. SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR, BREZHNEV HAS FURTHER CONSOLIDATED HIS ROLE AS NATIONAL LEADER AND SPOKESMAN. HIS POLITBURO PEERS IN PUBLIC SPEECHES HAVE TAKEN TO REFERRING TO HIM AS "LEONID ILYICH" (JUST AS THEY REFER TO LENIN AS "VLADIMIR ILYICH") AND HAVE BEGUN APPLYING TO HIM THE RITUAL (AND EXTRA-LEGAL) TITLE "HEAD OF THE POLITBURO." AFTER LONG RESISTING THIS PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF BREZHNEV'S PRE-EMINENCE, BOTH PODGORNYY AND KOSYGIN FELL INTO LINE DURING THE CEREMONIES CONNECTED WITH KOSYGIN'S 70TH BIRTHDAY IN FEBRUARY. BREZHNEV MAY BE TAKING ON THE AURA OF UNTOUCHABLE NATIONAL LEADER. IF HIS COLLEAGUES
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 069060

PERMIT THIS TO HAPPEN - AS THEY SEEM TO BE - THEY MUST ACCEPT THAT IT MEANS A NARROWING OF THEIR OWN OPTIONS AS A COLLECTIVE AND IMPROVES BREZHNEV'S ABILITY TO OVERRIDE THEM IN THE EVENT OF A FUTURE POLICY CRUNCH. KOSYGIN SEEMS TO BE SLIDING RELATIVE TO BREZHNEV; PODGORNYY SEEMS ROBUST AND ACTIVE; AND SOME OF THE YOUNGER LUMPNIES HAVE JUMPED ON THE BREZHNEV BANDWAGON, AT LEAST IN THEIR SPEECHES.

3. AGRICULTURE. BREZHNEV IS NO NEWCOMER TO AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS, AND HIS RECENT INITIATIVE - CULMINATING IN THE FANFARE OF HIS ALMA ATA SPEECH MARCH 15 - INDICATES A RESUMPTION OF HIS POLICY LEADERSHIP IN THIS FIELD.

THE BASIC INGREDIENTS OF HIS FARM PROGRAM - A REVAMPED RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE CREATION OF LARGE SPECIALIZED FARMS AND PROCESSING CENTERS - ARE DIRECTED AT REDUCING THE GREAT FLUCTUATIONS IN ANNUAL HARVESTS WHICH HAVE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY. THE LUKEWARM RESPONSE TO HIS REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS SUGGESTS THAT THE AGRICULTURAL BUREAUCRACY, AND PERHAPS AGRICULTURE MINISTER POLYANSKIY AS WELL, MAY FEEL THREATENED. IF BREZHNEV SUCCESSFULLY PERSEVERES, HOWEVER, THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE IMPORTANT FOR WORLD TRADE IN FOOD AS WELL AS FOR BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL POSITION.

4. SOLZHENITSYN. THE GULAG AFFAIR, WHICH SPANNED MOST OF THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1974, PROVIDED SOME INSTRUCTIVE INSIGHT INTO THE RELATIVE PRIORITIES OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND DETENTE. THE NATURE OF GULAG - A DOCUMENTED ASSAULT ON THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE - OBVIOUSLY REQUIRED A RESPONSE, BUT DETENTE CONSIDERATIONS IMPELLED THE LEADERSHIP TO SETTLE FOR EXPULSION. IT APPEARS FROM HERE THAT THE REGIME IS OVER THE HUMP AS FAR AS FOREIGN REACTION TO SOLZHENITSYN IS CONCERNED. STILL, THE PROSPECT OF POLEMICS BY THE WRITER NOW THAT HIS FAMILY IS SAFELY OUT AND THE EFFECT OF GULAG'S PUBLICATION IN THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE MUST STILL BE WORRISOME. INTERNALLY THE NOISE HAS ALSO TAPERED OFF, BUT OUT-SPOKENNESS BY FRINGE ESTABLISHMENT FIGURES COULD FOLLOW THE PROTESTS ALREADY MADE BY YEVTUSHENKO AND CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 069060

NEKRASOV. THE STATEMENT GIVEN TO WESTERN JOURNALISTS BY THE SCULPTOR NEIZVESTNY, COMPLAINING ABOUT LIMITS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL, IS AN EXAMPLE. A SCHOLARLY COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS ON THE SOLZHENITSYN AFFAIR, PUT TOGETHER BY SAKHAROV AND HIS PROTEGES, IS CURRENTLY IN CIRCULATION IN MOSCOW. IT INCLUDES LETTERS OF SUPPORT SENT TO PRAVDA BY INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT PART OF THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED CIRCLE OF DISSIDENTS. CONTINUED OUTSPOKENNESS DOMESTICALLY COULD PROVIDE ADDED AMMUNITION AGAINST DETENTE FOR DOOM-SAYERS IN THE KGB.

5. GRECHKO ON DEFENSE. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS SPOKEN FREQUENTLY DURING THE LAST QUARTER ABOUT THE CONTINUOUS EXPANSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER. WE THINK IT WOULD BE AN EXAGGERATION TO READ HIS TOUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS AS A REFLECTION OF OPPOSITION TO DETENTE. IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THE MILITARY SHOULD COUNSEL CAUTION ON SALT AND MBFR AND LOBBY FOR ITS SHARE OF THE RESOURCE PIE. GRECHKO'S STATEMENTS ARE PROBABLY ALSO A REACTION TO U.S. PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE ISSUES AND A RATHER SUBDUED RATTLING OF BARGAINING CHIPS. THE DEGREE OF DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO INCREASED SOVIET

MILITARY SPENDING REMAINS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE. IN ANY CASE, BREZHNEV'S GRANDIOSE PLANS FOR AGRICULTURE NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE SEEMS NO NEAR-TERM PROSPECT THAT MILITARY BUDGET ALLOCATIONS ARE THREATENED WITH DIVERSION TO OTHER SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY.

6. SOVIET WESTPOLITIK. THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1974 PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW IS FLAGGING IN ITS COMMITMENT TO DETENTE WITH THE WEST. DESPITE A BREZHNEV-POMPIDOU SUMMIT WHICH PRESERVED ATMOSPHERICS BUT LITTLE ELSE, A GATHERING SQUALL WITH THE FRG OVER BERLIN, AND A CONTINUING PROBLEM WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS, THE LEADERSHIP HAS HAD NO SECOND THOUGHTS THAT WE CAN DISCERN. WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO THE U.S., THE SOVIETS GAVE GREAT PUBLIC EMPHASIS DURING SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO THEIR COMMITMENT TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. BREZHNEV APPARENTLY CONTINUES TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON'S SUMMIT VISIT AS AN IMPORTANT STAR IN HIS DETENTE CROWN, AND SOVIET COMMENTATORS MENTIONED
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 069060

THE SUMMIT FREQUENTLY DURING THE WEEK OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. WATERGATE REMAINS FOR THE LEADERSHIP A CAUSE OF CONCERN RATHER THAN AN OPENING FOR MISCHIEF.

7. U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO HEDGE THEIR INTERNAL POSITION BY PLAYING DOWN THE NEGATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE MFN/CREDITS ISSUE. EVEN THEIR PRIVATE REACTION TO US FOLLOWING THE EXIM BANK'S TEMPORARY CREDIT SUSPENSION WAS RESTRAINED. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREDITS CAUSES THEM CONCERN. BREZHNEV HAS PUBLICLY LINKED ECONOMIC WITH POLITICAL RELATIONS AND THE FALL-OFF IN JEWISH EMIGRATION FIGURES FOR JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, FOLLOWED BY A RESURGENCE IN MARCH, MAY CARRY A MESSAGE. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY STILL HOPE FOR A VIABLE COMPROMISE IN CONGRESS. OUR ECONOMIC CONTACTS HERE HAVE GIVEN NO HINT OF SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS IF COMPROMISE FAILS; THEY CONTINUE TO BE BULLISH ON THE EXPANSION OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC TIES. THERE IS A DANGER, HOWEVER, THAT INTERNAL OPPONENTS OF DETENTE COULD SEIZE ON A CREDIT REVERSAL TO QUESTION THE U.S.'S POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO IMPROVED RELATIONS.

8. THE TONE OF DETENTE. WHILE THE SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET WESTPOLITIK HAS NOT CHANGED OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS, ITS TONE HAS. THERE IS NOW MORE WILLINGNESS IN THE PRESS TO TAKE ON THE WEST IDEOLOGICALLY AND TO REVEL IN WESTERN DISSENSIONS. WHILE SOME OF THE SHARPENED RHETORIC IS PURE OPPORTUNISM DURING A TIME OF TROUBLES AMONG WESTERN COUNTRIES, IT IS PROBABLY ALSO THE PRODUCT OF A DECISION DISCUSSED AT THE MOSCOW MEETING

OF WARSAW PACT IDEOLOGICAL SECRETARIES IN LATE DECEMBER; THERE HAVE BEEN REFLECTIONS IN OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WE DO NOT SEE THE HARSHER LANGUAGE AS AN ASSAULT ON DETENTE BUT RATHER AS AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE LIMITS AND TO MAKE DETENTE MORE PALATABLE TO THE IDEOLOGICALLY INCLINED. THAT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN THE MOTIVE FOR CC SECRETARY PONOMAREV'S JANUARY SPEECH DWELLING ON THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM. THE NEW TONE HAS BEEN MOST TYPICAL OF THE PRESS, BUT IT IS CREEPING INTO LEADERSHIP STATEMENTS AS WELL. BREZHNEV, FOR INSTANCE, CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 069060

OPENED FIRE ON THE WESTERN PRESS AT THE TIME OF THE POMPIDOU VISIT. WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO KEEP THEIR VERBAL SALLIES WITHIN LIMITS. THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE WESTERN RESISTANCE ON MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO MOSCOW, E.G. TRADE. NOR, IN OUR VIEW, DOES THEIR VERBAL EXPLOITATION OF THE U.S.-EUROPEAN RIFT EXTEND TO A DESIRE TO SEE A DEFINITIVE BREAK BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES - FOR THIS WOULD RAISE THE BOGEY OF A UNITED EUROPE WITH ITS OWN INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRUCTURE.

9. EAST-WEST ISSUES. THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR WAS A PERIOD OF SOVIET SPARRING OVER CSCE, MBFR, AND BERLIN. THE SECOND QUARTER SHOULD BRING MORE DEFINITE CLUES ABOUT MOSCOW'S WILLINGNESS TO BEND IN THE FACE OF WESTERN OBJECTIVES.

A. CSCE. DURING THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE YEAR, THE SOVIETS TALKED TOUGH ON CSCE, INSISTING ON THEIR VERSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, ON A HEAVILY CAVEATTED PREAMBLE TO BASKET THREE, AND ON A CONCLUDING SUMMIT, AND RESISTING EFFORTS BY SOME WESTERN DELEGATIONS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AS WELL AS THE WESTERN POSITION ON SUBSTANTIVE LANGUAGE ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND INFORMATION ISSUES. BY LATE MARCH, HOWEVER, NEW SOVIET FLEXIBILITY WAS APPARENT ON TWO OF THE STICKIER QUESTION - FRONTIERS AND INFORMATION. A COMPROMISE SEEMS TO BE SHAPING UP BETWEEN THE CONTENTS OF BASKETS ONE AND THREE AND ON A GENERAL PREAMBLE FOR BASKET THREE. THE NARROW PARAMETERS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON CONTACTS ARE ILLUSTRATED BY THE LIMITED NATURE OF SOVIET LIBERALIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC TRAVEL CONTROLS. BUT SOME GIVE IS LIKELY, SINCE THE OVERRIDING SOVIET CONCERN IS STILL TO HAVE CSCE END IN A WAY THAT WILL ALLOW THEM TO PLAY IT AS ANOTHER MAJOR SUCCESS FOR THEIR DETENTE POLICY.

B. MBFR, UNLIKE CSCE, IS NOT A SOVIET-SPONSORED SHOW, AND THEIR APPROACH SO FAR - WHICH HAS BEEN FAIRLY RIGID ON SUBSTANCE - SHOWS LITTLE SIGN THAT THEY ARE

IN A HURRY. THEIR DISIRE TO INCLUDE EUROPEAN FORCES
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 069060

IN STAGE ONE REDUCTIONS IS A STRONG ONE, BASED ON THE
HOPE THAT, ONCE A PROCESS OF EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS BEGINS,
THE STEAM WILL GO OUT OF ANY PLANS FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE
INTEGRATION. THUS, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT EASILY GIVE IN
ON THIS POINT.

C. BERLIN. SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT FRG ACTIONS IN
BERLIN ESCALATED DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE YEAR,
CULMINATING IN VEILED THREATS OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE
TRANSIT ROUTES. AS WE SEE IT, THE POINT AT ISSUE -
THE PLANNED ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGENCY IN WEST BERLIN - IS NOT SO IMPORTANT TO THE
SOVIETS AS THE FEAR THAT THERE WILL BE MORE SUCH
FRG INITIATIVES. IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT MOSCOW WANTS
A CONFRONTATION OVER THE ISSUE. NEVERTHELESS, WE DOUBT
THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BACK DOWN WITHOUT SOME KIND OF
ALLIED ASSURANCE THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEA
IS NOT THE BEGINNING OF A TREND.

10. MIDDLE EAST. SOVIET PRESS TREATMENT OF MIDDLE EAST
ISSUES HAS REFLECTED SOME UNHAPPINESS AT MOSCOW'S
POSITION ON THE SIDELINES. THE APPROACH HAS BEEN TO
TREAT U.S. MEDIATION EFFORTS EITHER AS INSIGNIFICANT
OR AS SMALL FIRST STEPS ON THE LONG ROAD TO SETTLEMENT.
GROMYKO'S VISIT TO THE AREA SEEMED DESIGNED TO WIN
EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO A GUARANTEED SOVIET
ROLE IN FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS AND TO STRENGTHEN SOVIET
INFLUENCE OVER SYRIA'S NEGOTIATING POSITION. IT IS
STILL OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED
IN A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT - LARGELY
BECAUSE IT WOULD TAKE THE PLAY BACK TO GENEVA WHERE THEY
CAN BECOME MORE ACTIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS
MAY BE INCLINED TO VIEW SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT
AS A TESTING GROUND FOR THEIR MIDDLE EAST ROLE. TO
DEMONSTRATE THEIR IMPORTANCE TO THE ARABS, TO CURB
THE MOMENTUM OF U.S. DIPLOMACY, AND TO REBUKE CAIRO
(WITH WHICH MOSCOW'S RELATIONS HAVE WORSENERED), THEY
MAY BE TEMPTED TO INSIST ON BETTER TERMS FOR SYRIA
THAN EGYPT GOT VIA U.S. MEDIATION. SOVIET
HELPLESSNESS IN GOLAN IS THUS LIKELY TO DEPEND ON
THEIR ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER THE ULTIMATE AGREEMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 069060

WILL ENHANCE THEIR POSITION WITH THE ARABS.
MEANWHILE, MOSCOW CONTINUES TO INCH CLOSER TO SUPPORT
FOR THE PLO AND ARAFAT - A REMINDER THAT IT SEES THE
PALESTINIANS, AS WELL AS SYRIA, AS A SOVIET HOLE

CARD IN THE AREA.

11. COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. DESPITE THEIR EMPHASIS ON DETENTE WITH THE WEST, THE SOVIETS APPEAR ALSO TO BE TURNING THEIR ATTENTION INCREASINGLY TO TWO PROBLEMS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT: CHINA AND THE PROGRAM OF COMMUNIST CONFERENCES.

A. THE SOVIETS HAVE CHINA ON THEIR MINDS THESE DAYS, PERHAPS EVEN MORE THAN USUAL. THE CHINESE EXPULSION OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN JANUARY AND CAPTURE OF A SOVIET HELICOPTER AND CREW IN MARCH HAVE FORCED AN EMBARRASSING BILATERAL PROBLEM ON MOSCOW. REACTION SO FAR HAS BEEN RESTRAINED, BUT THE LEADERSHIP MAY STILL BE CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND. THE CHINESE INTERNAL SITUATION LENDS ITSELF TO SPECULATION ABOUT A POWER STRUGGLE, WHICH IN TURN AROUSES BOTH CONCERN AND POSSIBLY SOME WISHFUL THINKING HERE. WHILE IT WOULD BE NATURAL FOR THE SOVIETS TO TAKE SOME CONTINGENCY STEPS IN THE PRESENT UNCERTAIN SITUATION, SUCH MOVES COULD IN THEIR WON RIGHT LEAD TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF SINO-SOVIET TENSION. MOREOVER, THERE IS ALWAYS THE RISK THAT A SUDDEN FLUID SITUATION, SUCH AS MIGHT BE BROUGHT ON BY THE DEATH OF MAO, COULD TEMPT THE SOVIETS TO LEND A HAND TO ELEMENTS IN CHINA WHICH THEY DEEM SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR MOSCOW BRAND OF MARXISM-LENINISM.

B. COMMUNIST CONFERENCES. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PUSH PRIVATELY FOR A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE AND A WORLD CONFERENCE TO FOLLOW. SO FAR THEY HAVE BEEN CONTENT TO LET THE CALL FOR THE TWO CONFERENCES ISSUE FROM THE MOUTHS OF OTHERS. AS THE TIME FOR CONCRETE PLANNING DRAWS NEAR, THEY WILL PROBABLY ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE CONFERENCES IN A MORE DIRECT WAY. AN UNSIGNED PRAVDA ARTICLE MARCH 30 NOTING THE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION SINCE THE 1969 MEETING AND EXPRESSING UNDERSTANDING OF THE DESIRE OF FRATERNAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 069060

PARTIES FOR A NEW EXCHANGE OF VIEWS MAY MARK THE BEGINNING OF THIS PROCESS. THE SOVIETS WILL BE FORCED TO DEAL WITH THE UNCOMFORTABLE INDEPENDENT POSITIONS OF THE ITALIAN, ROMANIAN, AND OTHER PARTIES - A PROBLEM WHICH INVOLVES PITFALLS FOR THE COMMUNIST UNITY SO TREASURED BY MOSCOW.

12. THE ECONOMY. SOVIET INTERNAL ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF 1974 MATCHED OR EXCEEDED PROJECTIONS. INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT WAS 9.1 PERCENT HIGHER THAN FOR THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD IN 1973, AND OVERALL PLAN TARGETS FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION DURING JANUARY AND FEBRUARY WERE THUS OVERFULFILLED (BY 6.8 PERCENT).

AS REPORTED BY THE PRESS, PRODUCTION FIGURES FOR A
NUMBER OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC SECTORS WERE
PARTICULARLY SATISFYING: THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES,
MACHINE CONSTRUCTION, INSTRUMENT MANUFACTURE, THE
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS, AND THE
FOOD INDUSTRY. AS ALWAYS, SOME SECTORS LAGGED BEHIND,
CHIEF AMONG THEM AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, TRACTORS,
TEXTILES, PAPER AND CELLULOSE, AND CONSUMER GOODS.
THESE ARE THE SAME SECTORS WHICH NORMALLY FAIL TO
ACHIEVE PLAN GOALS. DESPITE THIS STRONG RUNNING START,
IT IS STILL FAR TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER 1974
WILL BE A PRIME YEAR FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY. TYPICALLY,
THESE FIRST MONTHS OF THE PLAN YEAR HAVE REFLECTED
ELATION, ENTHUSIASM AND PEP TALKS. THE YEAR'S ACTUAL
ACHIEVEMENTS WILL NOT BEGIN TO BE DISCERNIBLE UNTIL
SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER.
STOESSEL

UNQUOTE RUSH

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DETENTE, QUARTERLY REPORTS, EAST WEST MEETINGS, POLITICAL LEADERS, POLITICAL SITUATION, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE069060
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA/TUR:RSDILLON
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D740079-0074
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740483/abbrzcqy.tel
Line Count: 400
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: USSR QUARTERLY TRENDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR
To: ANKARA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005